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Towards joint decoding of binary Tardos
fingerprinting codes
Peter Meerwald and Teddy Furon
Abstract
The class of joint decoder of probabilistic fingerprinting codes is of utmost importance in theoretical papers to
establish the concept of fingerprint capacity [1]–[3]. However, no implementation supporting a large user base is
known to date. This article presents an iterative decoder which is, as far as we are aware of, the first practical attempt
towards joint decoding. The discriminative feature of the scores benefits on one hand from the side-information of
previously accused users, and on the other hand, from recently introduced universal linear decoders for compound
channels [4]. Neither the code construction nor the decoder make precise assumptions about the collusion (size
or strategy). The extension to incorporate soft outputs from the watermarking layer is straightforward. An extensive
experimental work benchmarks the very good performance and offers a clear comparison with previous state-of-the-art
decoders.
Index Terms
Traitor tracing, Tardos codes, fingerprinting, compound channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traitor tracing or active fingerprinting has witnessed a flurry of research efforts since the invention of the now
well-celebrated Tardos codes [5]. The codes of G. Tardos are optimal in the sense that the code length m necessary
to fulfill the following requirements (n users, c colluders, probability of accusing at least one innocent below Pfp)
has the minimum scaling in Ω(c2 log nP−1fp ).
A first group of articles analyses such probabilistic fingerprinting codes from the viewpoint of information theory.
They define the worst case attack a collusion of size c can produce, and also the best counter-attack. The main
achievement is a saddle point theorem in the game between the colluders and the code designer which establishes
the concept of fingerprinting capacity C(c) [1]–[3]. Roughly speaking, for a maximum size of collusion c, the
maximum number of users exponentially grows with m with an exponent equal to C(c), to guarantee vanishing
probabilities of error asymptotically as the code length increases. Sec. II summarizes these elements of information
theory.
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Our point of view is much more practical and signal processing oriented. Thanks to an appropriate watermarking
technique, m bits have been hidden in the distributed copies. At the time a pirated version is discovered, the
content has been distributed to n users. Our goal is to identify some colluders under the strict requirement that the
probability of accusing innocents is below Pfp. It is clear that we are not in an asymptotic setup since m and n are
fixed. The encoder and the decoder are not informed of the collusion size and its attack, therefore there is no clue
whether the actual rate R = m−1 log2 n is indeed below capacity C(c).
A second group of research works deals with decoding algorithms. Here, a first difficulty is to compute user
scores that are as discriminative as possible. A second difficulty is to set a threshold such that one can reliably
accuse users who are part of the collusion. These two steps are not easy since the decoder does not know the size
and the attack of the collusion. Sec. III sums up the past approaches which are mainly based on single decoders.
It also motivates our decoder based on compound channel theory and the use of a rare event estimator.
A third difficulty is to have a fast implementation of the accusation algorithm in order to face a large-scale set of
users. A main advantage of some fingerprinting schemes based on error-correcting codes is to offer an accusation
procedure with runtime polynomial in m [6], [7]. In comparison, the well-known Tardos-Sˇkoric´ single decoder is
an exhaustive search of complexity O(nm) [5], [8]. Since in theory n can asymptotically be in the order of 2mR,
decoding of Tardos codes might be intractable. Again, we do not consider such a theoretical setup, but we pay
attention to maintain an affordable decoding complexity for orders of magnitude met in practical applications.
Sec. IV focuses on the iterative architecture of our joint decoder based on three primitives: channel inference,
score computation, and thresholding. Its iterative nature stems from two key ideas: i) the codeword of a newly
accused user is integrated as a side information for the next iterations, ii) joint decoding is manageable on a short
list of suspects. Sec. V provides an extension to soft decoding. In Sec. VI we present our experimental investigations
with a comparison with related works for typical values of (m,n). This shows the benefit of our decoder: better
decoding performance with acceptable runtime in practical scenarios.
II. TARDOS CODE AND THE COLLUSION MODEL
We briefly review the construction and some known facts about Tardos codes.
A. Construction
The binary code is composed of n codewords of m bits. The codeword xj = (xj(1), · · · , xj(m))T identifying
user j ∈ U = [n], where [n] := {1, . . . , n}, is composed of m binary symbols independently drawn at the code
construction s.t. P(xj(i) = 1) = pi, ∀i ∈ [m]. At initialization, the auxiliary variables {pi}mi=1 are independent and
identically drawn according to distribution f(p) : [0, 1] → R+. Both the code Ξ = [x1, . . . ,xn] and the auxiliary
sequence p = (p1, . . . , pm)T must be kept as secret parameters.
B. Collusion attack
The collusion attack or collusion channel describes the way the c colluders C = {j1, . . . , jc} merge their binary
codewords xj1 , . . . ,xjc to forge the binary pirated sequence y. It is usually modelled as a memoryless discrete
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multiple access channel, which is fair in the sense that all colluders participate equally in the forgery. This assumption
comes from the fact that the worst case attacks are indeed memoryless for Tardos codes where symbols are generated
independently, [9, Lemma 3.3]. Moreover, in a detect-many scenario, there is no hope in identifying almost idle
colluders if the attack is not fair [9, Lemma 3.2].
This leads to a 2 × (c + 1) probability transition matrix [P(Y |Φ)] where Φ = ∑j∈C Xj is a random variable
counting the number of ‘1’ the colluders received out of c symbols. A common parameter of the collusion attack
on binary codes is denoted by the vector θc = (θc(0), . . . , θc(c))T with θc(ϕ) = P(Y = 1|Φ = ϕ). The usual
working assumption, so-called marking assumption [10], imposes that θc(0) = 1− θc(c) = 0. The set of collusion
attacks that c colluders can lead under the marking assumption is denoted by Θc:
Θc = {θ ∈ [0, 1]c+1, θ(0) = 1− θ(c) = 0}. (1)
Examples of attacks following this model are given, for instance, in [11].
C. Accusation
Denote A ⊂ U the set of users accused by the decoder. The probability of false positive is defined by Pfp =
P(A 6⊂ C). In practice, a major requirement is to control this feature so that it is lower than a given significance
level.
In a detect-one scenario, A is either a singleton, or the empty set. A good decoder has a low probability of false
negative defined by Pfn = P(A = ∅). In a detect-many scenario, several users are accused, and a possible figure of
merit is the number of caught colluders: |A ∩ C|. In the literature, there exists a third scenario, so-called detect-all,
where a false negative happens if at least one colluder is missed. This article only considers the first two scenarios.
D. Guidelines from information theory
This article does not pretend to any new theoretical contribution, but presents some recent elements to stress
guidelines when designing our practical decoder.
A single decoder computes a score per user. It accuses users whose score is above a threshold (detect-many
scenario) or the user with the biggest score above the threshold (detect-one scenario). Under both scenarios and
provided that the collusion is fair, the performance of such decoders is theoretically bounded by the achievable rate
RS(f,θc) = I(X;Y |P,θc) = EP∼f [I(X;Y |p,θc)] [9, Th. 4.1]. A fundamental result is that, for a given collusion
size c, there exists an equilibrium (f˘c,S , θ˘c,S) to the max-min game between the colluders (who select θ) and the
code designer (who selects f ) as defined by maxf minθ∈Θc RS(f,θ) in [1, Th. 4].
A joint decoder computes a score per subset of ` ≤ c users and accuses the users belonging to subsets whose
score is above a threshold or only the most likely guilty amongst these users. Under both scenarios and provided that
the collusion is fair, the performance of such decoders is theoretically bounded by the achievable rate RJ(f,θc) =
`−1I(Φ;Y |P,θc) = `−1EP∼f [I(Φ;Y |p,θc)] [9, Th. 3.3]. Φ denotes the random variable sum of the subset user
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symbols. Moreover, for a given collusion size c, there also exists an equilibrium (f˘c,J , θ˘c,J) to the max-min game
maxf minθ∈Θc RJ(f,θ) [1, Th. 4].
Asymptotically, as c→ +∞, both f˘c,J and f˘c,S converge to fT (p) = 1/(pi
√
p(1− p)), the distribution originally
proposed by G. Tardos [1, Cor. 7], and both minθ RJ(fT ,θ) and minθ RS(fT ,θ) quickly approach the equilibrium
value of the respective max-min game [1, Fig. 2]. Yet, the code designer needs to bet on a collusion size c′ in order
to use the optimal distribution f˘c′,S (or f˘c′,J if the decoder is joint). Integer c′ plays the role of a desired security
level.
Despite the division by ` in the expression of RJ(f,θ), it appears that RS(f,θ) ≤ RJ(f,θ), ∀θ [9, Eq. (3.4)].
This tells us that a joint decoder is theoretically more powerful than a single decoder. However, a joint decoder
needs to compute O(n`) scores since there are
(
n
`
)
subsets of size `. This complexity is absolutely intractable
for large-scale applications even for a small `. This explains why, so far, joint decoders were only considered
theoretically to derive fingerprinting capacity. Our idea is that there is no need to consider all these subsets since
a vast majority is only composed of innocent users. Our decoder iteratively prunes out users deemed as innocents
and considers the subsets over the small set of remaining suspects.
This iterative strategy results in a decoder which is a mix of single and joint decoding. Unfortunately, it prevents
us from taking advantage of the game theory theorems mentioned above. We cannot find the optimal distribution f
and the worst collusion attack against our decoder. Nevertheless, our decoder works with any distribution f under
some conditions stated in Sec. III. For all these reasons, the experiments of Sec. VI are done with the most common
Tardos distribution fT .
M. Fernandez and M. Soriano proposed an iterative accusation process of an error correcting code based
fingerprinting scheme [7]. Each iteration takes advantage of the codewords of colluders already identified in the
previous iterations. The same idea is possible with Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code. This is justified by the
fact that the side information ∆, defined as the random variable sum of the already identified colluder symbols,
increases the mutual information: I(Φ;Y |P,θc) ≤ I(Φ;Y |P,θc,∆). Indeed, side information helps more than joint
decoding as proved by [9, Eq. (3.3)].
The above guidelines can be summarized as follows: use the continuous Tardos distribution fT for code con-
struction, integrate the codewords of accused users as side information and finally use a joint decoder on a short
list of suspects.
III. A SINGLE DECODER BASED ON COMPOUND CHANNEL THEORY AND RARE EVENT ANALYSIS
This section first reviews some single decoders and presents new decoders based on compound channel theory
and rare event analysis. The first difficulty is to compute a score per user such that the colluders are statistically well
separated from the innocents scores. The second difficulty is to set a practical threshold such that the probability
of false positive is under control.
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Detection theory tells us that the score given by the Log-Likelihood Ratio (LLR):
sj =
m∑
i=1
log
P(y(i)|xj(i),θc)
P(y(i)|θc) , (2)
is optimally discriminative in the Neyman-Pearson sense to decide the guiltiness of user j. Yet, the LLR needs
the knowledge of the true collusion attack θc which prevents the use of this optimal single decoder in practical
settings. Some papers proposed a so-called ‘Learn and Match’ strategy using the LLR score tuned on an estimation
θˆ of the attack channel [11]. Unfortunately, a lack of identifiability obstructs a direct estimation from (y,p) (see
Sec. III-B). Indeed, the estimation is sound only if c is known, and if the number of different values taken by p is
bigger1 or equal than c−1: P(Y = 1|θ, p) is a polynomial in p of degree at most c (see (14) with u = 0 and v = 0)
going from point (0, 0) to (1, 1), we need c − 1 more points to uniquely identify this polynomial. To overcome
this lack of information about c, an Expectation-Maximization (E.-M.) approach has been proposed but it is not
satisfactory since it does not scale well with the number of users [11]. Moreover, the setting of the threshold was
not addressed.
On the other hand, there are decoders that do not adapt their score computation to the collusion. This is the
case of the score computation originally proposed by G. Tardos [5], and later-on improved by B. Sˇkoric´ et al. [8].
It has an invariance property: its statistics, up to the second order, do not depend on the collusion attack channel
θ, but only on the collusion size c [12]. Thanks to this invariance, whatever the collusion attack is, there exists a
threshold τ guaranteeing a probability of false positive below Pfp while keeping the false negative away from 1
provided that the code is long enough, i.e. m = Ω(c2 log nP−1fp ). However, there is a price to pay: the scores are
clearly less discriminative than the LLR.
Some theoretical papers [13, Sec. V] [9, Sec. 5.2] promote another criterion, so-called ‘universality’, for the
design of decoders. The performance (usually evaluated as the achievable rate or the error exponent) when facing a
collusion channel θc should not be lower than the performance against the worst attack θ?c . In a sense, it is a clear
warning to the ‘Learn and Match’ strategy. Suppose that θc 6= θ?c and that, for some reasons, the estimation of
the collusion attack is of poor quality. In any case, a mismatch between θˆ and θc should not ruin the performance
of the decoder to the point it is even lower than what is achievable under the worst attack θ?c . The above cited
references [9], [13] recommend the single universal decoder based on the empirical mutual information I(x;y|p)
(or empirical equivocation for joint decoder). The setting of the threshold depends on the desired error exponent
of the false positive rate. Therefore, it is valid only asymptotically.
To summarize, there have been two approaches: adaptation or non-adaptation to the collusion process. The first
class is not very well grounded since the estimation of the collusion is an issue and the impact of a mismatch
has to be studied. The second approach is more reliable, but with a loss of discrimination power compared to the
optimal LLR. The next sections presents two new decoders belonging to both approaches based on the compound
channel theory.
1This is the case in this article since we opt for the continuous Tardos distribution fT .
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A. Some elements on compound channels
Recently, in the setup of digital communication through compound channels, E. Abbe and L. Zheng [4] proposed
universal decoders which are linear, i.e. in essence very simple. This section summarizes this theory and the next
one proposes two applications for Tardos single decoders.
A compound channel is a set S of channels, say discrete memoryless channels X ∈ X → Y ∈ Y defined
by their probability transition matrix Wθ = [P(Y |X, θ)] parameterized by θ ∈ Θ. The coder shares a code book
Ξ = {xj}nj=1 ∈ Xm×n with the decoder. Its construction is assumed to be a random code realization from a
provably good mass distribution PX . After receiving a channel output y ∈ Ym, a decoder computes a score per
codeword xj , j ∈ [n], and yields the message associated with the codeword with the biggest score. The decoder is
linear if the score has the following structure:
sj =
m∑
i=1
d(xj(i), y(i)), (3)
with d(·, ·) : X × Y → R. For instance, score (2), so-called MAP decoder in digital communications [4], is linear
with d(x, y) = log(P(y|x, θ)/P(y|θ)). However, in the compound channel setup, the decoder does not know through
which channel of S the codeword has been transmitted, and therefore it cannot rely on the MAP.
We are especially interested in two results. First, if S is one-sided (see Def. 1 below), then the MAP decoder
tuned on the worst channel Wθ? is a linear universal decoder [4, Lemma 5]. If S =
⋃K
k=1 Sk with K finite and
Sk one-sided ∀k ∈ [K], then the following generalized linear decoder is universal [4, Th. 1] and the score of a
codeword is the maximum of the K MAP scores tuned on the worst channel Wθ?k of each Sk:
sj = max
k∈[K]
m∑
i=1
log
P(y(i)|xj(i), θ?k)
P(y(i)|θ?k)
. (4)
Definition 1 (One-sided set, Def. 3 of [4]): A set S is one-sided with respect to an input distribution PX
• if the following minimizer is unique:
Wθ? = arg min
θ∈cl(Θ)
I(PX , θ), (5)
with I(PX , θ) the mutual information I(X;Y ) with (X,Y ) ∼ PX ◦ Wθ (where P ◦ W denotes the joint
distribution with P the distribution of X and W the conditional distribution), and cl(Θ) the closure of Θ,
• and if, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
D(PX ◦Wθ||PX × PY,θ?) ≥D(PX ◦Wθ||PX ◦Wθ?)+
D(PX ◦Wθ? ||PX × PY,θ?).
(6)
with D(·||·) the Kullback-Leibler distance, PY,θ the marginal of Y induced by PX ◦Wθ, and PX × PY,θ the
product of the marginals.
B. Application to single Tardos decoders
Contrary to the code construction phase, it is less critical at the decoding side to presume that the real collusion
size c is less or equal to a given parameter cmax. This parameter can be set to the largest number of colluders the
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fingerprinting code can handle with a reasonable error probability knowing (m,n). Another argument is that this
assumption is not definitive. If the decoding fails because the assumption does not hold true, nothing prevents us
to re-launch decoding with a bigger cmax. Let us assume c ≤ cmax in the sequel.
A first application of the work [4] is straightforward: The collusion channel belongs to the set
⋃cmax
k=2 Θk as
defined (1), and thanks to [4, Lemma 4] each convex set Θk is one-sided. According to [4, Th. 1], the decoder
based on the following score is universal:
sj = max
k∈[2,...,cmax]
m∑
i=1
log
P(y(i)|xj(i),θ?k,fT )
P(y(i)|θ?k,fT )
, (7)
where θ?k,fT = arg minΘk RS(fT ,θ), ∀k ∈ [2, . . . , cmax]. This decoder does not adapt its score computation to the
collusion attack.
The second application is more involved as the lack of identifiability turns to our advantage. The true collusion
channel θc has generated data y distributed as P(y|p,θc). Let us define the class E(θc) = {θ˜|P(y|p, θ˜) =
P(y|p,θc), ∀(y, p) ∈ {0, 1}× [0, 1]}. Thanks to [14, Prop. 3], we know that E(θc) is not restricted to the singleton
{θc} since for any c′ > c there exists one θ˜c′ ∈ E(θc). This holds especially for cmax. Asymptotically with the
code length, the consistent Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) parameterized on cmax, as defined in (16), yields
an estimation θˆcmax ≈ θ˜cmax ∈ E(θc) with increasing accuracy. This estimation is not reliable because c 6= cmax a
priori. Therefore, we prefer to refer to θˆcmax as a collusion inference rather than a collusion estimation, and the
scoring uses this inference as follows:
sj =
m∑
i=1
log
P(y(i)|xj(i), θˆcmax)
P(y(i)|θˆcmax)
. (8)
Suppose that the MLE tuned on cmax provides a perfect inference θˆcmax = θ˜cmax , we then succeed to restrict
the compound channel to the discrete set Ecmax(θc) which we define as the restriction of E(θc) to collusions of
size c˜ ≤ cmax. Appendix A shows that Ecmax(θc) is one-sided, and its worst attack is indeed θ˜cmax . Lemma 5
of [4] justifies the use of the MAP decoder (2) tuned on θˆcmax . Its application leads to a more efficient decoder
since RS(fT , θ˜cmax) ≥ RS(fT ,θ?cmax,fT ). This decoder pertains to the approach based on score adaptation, with the
noticeable advantages: it is better theoretically grounded and it is far less complex than the iterative E.-M. decoder
of [11].
Figure 1 illustrates the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) per user for the single decoders discussed so
far with m = 512 and c = 5 colluders performing worst-case (i.e. minimizing RS(fT ,θ) over Θ5) and majority
attack (θ5,maj = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)T ). For this figure, the false positive α(τ) and the false negative β(τ) are defined
per user as follows:
α(τ) = P(s(xinn,y,p) > τ), (9)
β(τ) = P(s(xj1 ,y,p) ≤ τ), (10)
where xinn is a random variable denoting the codeword of an innocent user and xj1 , the codeword of the first
colluder. The single decoder is tuned on the collusion inference θˆcmax (with cmax = 8) and performs almost as
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Fig. 1. ROC plot for several decoders; m = 512, c = 5, cmax = 8. Single (MI) is the decoder based on empirical mutual information [9],
Single (Compound) relates to (7), Single (MAP) is (2), Single is the LLR on θˆcmax (8), and Symm. Tardos is the symmetric version of the
G. Tardos scores proposed by B. Sˇkoric´ et al. in [8].
good as the MAP decoder having knowledge of θ. The ROC of the symmetric Tardos score is invariant w.r.t. the
collusion attack. The generalized linear decoder of (7) denoted compound takes little advantage of the fact that
the majority attack is much milder than the worst attack. For a fair comparison, the single decoder based on the
empirical mutual information [9] assumes a Tardos distribution uniformly quantized to 10 bins; better results (yet
still below the single decoder) can be obtained when tuned to the optimal discrete distribution for c = 5 colluders
[15].
The similarities between compound channel and fingerprinting has been our main inspiration, however some
differences prevent any claim of optimality. First, in the compound channel problem, there is a unique codeword
that has been transmitted, whereas in fingerprinting, y is forged from c codewords like in a multiple access channel.
Therefore, the derived single decoders are provably good for chasing a given colluder (detect-one scenario), but
they might not be the best when looking for more colluders (detect-many scenario). The second difference is that
the decoder should give up when not confident enough rather than taking the risk of being wrong in accusing an
innocent. The setting of a threshold is clearly missing for the moment.
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C. Rare event analysis
This section explains how we set a threshold τ in accordance with the required Pfp thanks to a rare event analysis.
Our approach is very different than [13] [9] [2] [5] where a theoretical development either finds a general threshold
suitable when facing a collusion of size c, or equivalently, where it claims a reliable decision when the rate is below
the capacity which depends on c. Our threshold does not need the value of c but it only holds for a given couple
(p,y) and a known n. Once these are fixed, the scoring sj = s(xj ,y,p) is a deterministic function from {0, 1}m
to R. Since the codewords of the innocent users are i.i.d. and c n, we have:
Pfp = 1− (1− P(s(xinn,y,p) > τ))n−c
≈ n · P(s(xinn,y,p) > τ).
(11)
The number of possible codewords can be evaluated as the number of typical sequences, i.e. in the order of
2mEP∼f [hb(p)], with hb(p) the entropy in bits of a Bernoulli random variable B(p). EP∼fT [hb(p)] ≈ 0.557 bits,
which leads to a far bigger number of typical sequences than n (say m ≥ 300 and n ≤ 108 in practice). This
shows that plenty of codewords have not been created when a pirate copy is found. Therefore, we consider them
as occurrences of xinn since we are sure that they have not participated in the forgery of y. The idea is then to
estimate τ s.t. P(s(xinn,y,p) > τ) = n−1Pfp thanks to a Monte Carlo simulation with newly created codewords.
The difficulty lies in the order of magnitude. Some typical requirements are n ≈ 106 and Pfp = 10−4, hence the
estimation of τ corresponding to a probability as small as 10−10. This is not tractable with a basic Monte Carlo on
a regular computer. However, the new estimator based on rare event analysis proposed in [16] performs remarkably
fast within this range of magnitude. It produces τˆ and a C-% confidence interval2 [τ−, τ+]. In our decoder, we
compare the scores to τ+ (i.e. a pessimistic estimate of τ ) to ensure a total false positive probability lower than
Pfp. Last but not least, this approach works for any single decoder.
IV. ITERATIVE, JOINT DECODING ALGORITHM
This section extends the single decoder based on the collusion inference θcmax towards joint decoding, thanks
to the guidelines of Sec. II-D. Preliminary results about these key ideas were first presented in [17] and [18]. A
schematic overview of the iterative, joint decoder is shown in Fig. 2.
A. Architecture
The first principle is to iterate the score computation and include users accused in previous iterations as side-
information to build a more discriminative test. Let USI = ∅ denote the initially empty set of accused users. In each
iteration we aim at identifying a (possibly empty) set of users A = {j ∈ U \ USI|sj > τ} and then update USI with
A.
Second, we additionally compute scores for subsets of t users of U \USI, t ≤ cmax. Obviously, there are
(|U\USI|
t
)
such subsets. As n is large, enumerating and computing a score for each subset is intractable even for small t. The
2We are C-% sure that the true τ lies in this interval.
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Fig. 2. Overview of the iterative, side-informed joint Tardos fingerprint decoder.
idea here is to find a restricted set U (t) ⊆ U \USI of n(t) = |U (t)| users that are the most likely to be guilty and keep
p(t) =
(
n(t)
t
)
approximately constant and within our computation resources. We gradually reduce n(t) by pruning
out users who are unlikely to be colluder when going from single (t = 1) decoding, to pair (t = 2) decoding, etc.
If n(t) = O(n1/t), then score computation of t-subsets over the restricted user set is within O(n) just like for the
single decoder.
Initially, the joint pair-decoder starts with the list of users ranked by the scores derived from the single decoder
in decreasing order, i.e. the top-ranked user is most likely to be a colluder. Later on, the joint t-subset decoder
produces a new list of scores computed from subsets of t users which – according to theoretical results [2], [9] – are
more discriminative as t increases. Denote T  ⊆ U (t) the t-subset of users with the highest score. Our algorithm
tries to accuse the most likely colluder within T , and, if successful, updates USI and continues with the single
decoder. If no accusation can be made, the algorithm generates a new list of suspects U (t+1) based on the ranking
of joint scores that is fed to the subsequent t+ 1 joint decoding stage.
In the detect-one scenario, iteration stops after the first accusation. We restrict the subset size to t ≤ tmax, with
tmax = 5. This is not a severe limitation as for moderately large c, the decoding performance advantage of the
joint decoder quickly vanishes [9]. In the detect-many scenario, iteration stops when |USI| ≥ cmax or t reaches
min(tmax, cmax − |USI|) and no further accusation can be made. The set USI then contains the user indices to be
accused. Alg. 1 illustrates the architecture of the accusation process for the catch-many scenario.
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The next sections describe the score computation, the accusation of a user and the inference of the collusion
process in more details.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Joint Tardos Decoder.
Require: y, Ξ, p, cmax, tmax ≤ cmax, n(t), Pfp
1: U ← {j|1 ≤ j ≤ n}, USI ← ∅
2: repeat
3: t← 1
4: θˆcmax ← infere(y,p,USI, cmax)
5: W← weights(y,p, θˆcmax ,USI)
6: s← scores(U \ USI,Ξ,W)
7: τ ← threshold(p,W, n−1Pfp)
8: A ← {j ∈ U \ USI|sj > τ}
9: while A = ∅ and t < tmax do
10: t← t+ 1
11: U (t) ← {j ∈ U \ USI|sj > top(s, n(t))}
12: W← weights(y,p, θˆcmax ,USI)
13: s← scores((U(t)t ),Ξ,W)
14: τ ← threshold(p,W, (nt)−1Pfp, t)
15: T  ← arg max
T ∈U(t)
sT
16: if sT  > τ then
17: for all j ∈ T  and while A = ∅ do
18: W← weights(y,p, θˆcmax ,USI ∪ {T  \ j})
19: τ ′ ← threshold(p,W, n−1Pfp)
20: A ← {j|score(j,Ξ,W) > τ ′}
21: end for
22: end if
23: end while
24: USI ← USI ∪ A
25: until A = ∅ or |USI| ≥ cmax
26: return USI
B. Score computation
For a t-subset T , the accusation is formulated as a hypothesis test based on the observations (y, {xj}j∈T ) to
decide between H0 (all j ∈ T are innocent) and H1 (all j ∈ T are guilty). The score is just the LLR tuned on the
inference θˆcmax of the collusion process.
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All these sequences are composed of independent random variables thanks to the code construction and the
memoryless nature of the collusion. Moreover, the collusion only depends on the number of symbol ‘1’ present in
the codewords of a subset. Therefore, denote by δ and ϕ the accumulated codewords corresponding to USI and T :
δ =
∑
j∈USI xj and ϕ =
∑
j∈T xj . We have ∀i ∈ [m], 0 ≤ δ(i) ≤ nSI and 0 ≤ ϕ(i) ≤ t. Thanks to the linear
structure of the decoder, the score for a subset T of t users is simply
sT =
m∑
i=1
W (ϕ(i), i), (12)
where the (t+ 1)×m weight matrix W is pre-computed from (y,p) taking into account the side information USI
so that ∀(ϕ, i) ∈ {0, . . . , t} × {1, . . . ,m}:
W (ϕ, i) = log
P(y(i)|(ϕ, t), (δ(i), nSI), p(i), θˆcmax)
P(y(i)|(δ(i), nSI), p(i), θˆcmax)
. (13)
For indices s.t. y(i) = 1, both the numerator and the denominator share a generic formula, P (ϕ(i) + δ(i), t +
nSI, p(i), θˆcmax) and P (δ(i), nSI, p(i), θˆcmax) respectively, with
P (u, v, p, θˆcmax) =
cmax−v+u∑
k=u
θˆcmax(k)·(
cmax − v
k − u
)
pk−u(1− p)cmax−v−k+u.
(14)
In words, this expression gives the probability that y = 1 knowing that the symbol ‘1’ has been distributed to
users with probability p, the collusion model θˆcmax , and the identity of v colluders who have u symbols ‘1’ and
v − u symbols ‘0’. For indices s.t. y(i) = 0 in (13), the numerator and the denominator need to be ‘mirrored’:
(P → 1− P ).
At iterations based on the single decoder: t = 1 and ϕ = xj for user j. If nobody has been deemed guilty
so far, then δ(i) = nSI = 0, ∀i ∈ [m]. This score is defined if t + nSI ≤ cmax. Therefore, for a given size of
side-information, we cannot conceive a score for subsets of size bigger than cmax − nSI. This implies that in the
detect-many scenario, the maximal number of iterations depends on how fast USI grows.
C. Ranking users within a subset and joint accusation
Let T  denote the t-subset with the highest score. We accuse one user in T  only if sT  > τ . Let Tinn denote
a subset composed of innocent users. Using rare event analysis, τ is estimated s.t. P(s({xj}j∈Tinn ,y,p) > τ) =(
n
t
)−1
Pfp. This thresholding operation ensures that T  contains at least one colluder with a very high probability.
In order to rank and accuse the most probable traitor in T , we record for each user j ∈ U (t) the subset leading
to that user’s highest score:
T j = arg maxT {sT |j ∈ T }. (15)
We can count how often each user j appears in the recorded subsets {T j }j∈U(t) and denote this value aj . Finally,
for a given T , the users jk ∈ T can be arranged s.t. aj1 ≥ aj2 ≥ · · · ≥ ajt to establish a ranking of users per
subset.3
3This detail is omitted in Alg. 1 but necessary for procedure top().
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Fig. 3. Attack channel and collusion model inference.
To accuse a user j ∈ T , we check if the single score s(xj ,y,p,USI∪{T \j}) > τ ′ with τ ′ s.t. P(s(xinn,y,p,USI∪
{T  \ j}) > τ ′) = n−1Pfp. This method is suggested in [9, Sec. 5.3].
D. Inference of the collusion process
The MLE is used to infer about the collusion process:
θˆcmax = arg max
θ∈Θcmax
logP(y|p,USI,θ). (16)
Whenever a user is deemed guilty, it is added to side-information and we re-run the parameter estimation to refine
the collusion inference.
V. SOFT DECODING UNDER AWGN ATTACK
The marking assumption is an unrealistic restriction for traitor tracing with multimedia content as the colluders
are not limited to the copy-and-paste strategy for each symbol. They can merge the samples of their content versions
(audio samples, pixels, DCT coefficients, etc.) in addition to traditional attempts to compromise the watermark.
This may result in erroneously decoded symbols or erasures from the watermarking layer. Relaxing the marking
assumption leads to several approaches such as the combined digit model [19] [20, Sec. 4] and soft-decision decoding
schemes [21], [22]. This section extends the capability of our joint decoder to this latter case, replacing the probability
transition 2× (c+ 1) matrix [P(Y |Φ)] (see Sec. II-B) by c+ 1 probability density functions {θc(y|ϕ)}cϕ=0.
It is challenging if not impossible to exhibit a model encompassing all the merging attacks while being relevant for
a majority of watermarking techniques. Our approach as sketched in Fig. 3 is pragmatic. The sequence y′ ∈ Rm
is extracted from the pirated copy, with modulation y′(i) = 2y(i) − 1 if the signal is perfectly watermarked
with binary symbol y(i). To reflect the merging attack, the colluders forge values z(i) ∈ [−1, 1] and add noise:
y′(i) = z(i)+n(i) with n(i) ∼ N (0, σ2n). This would be the case, for instance, for a spread spectrum watermarking
where a symbol is embedded per block of content with an antipodal modulation of a secret carrier [21], [23].
The colluders have two strategies to agree on z. In a first strategy, they collude according to the marking
assumption (i.e. they copy-and-paste one of their samples) and add noise: z ∈ {−1, 1}m and the probability that
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Fig. 4. Examples of pdf θ7(y′|6) for the two models with σ2n = 0.25: [top] two modes (II) with (solid) the interleaving attack (θ(ϕ) = ϕ/c)
and (dashed) the coin-flip attack (θ(ϕ) = 1/2 for 0 < ϕ < c) ; (bottom) one mode (I) with (solid) averaging attack (µ(ϕ) = 2c−1ϕ− 1) and
(dashed) set to 0 attack (µ(ϕ) = 0 for 0 < ϕ < c).
z = 1 is given by the components of θc.
θ(II)c (y
′|ϕ) =
(
θc(ϕ)e
− (y′−1)2
2σ2n + (1− θc(ϕ))e
(y′+1)2
2σ2n
)
/
√
2piσ2n (17)
Except for ϕ ∈ {0, c}, the pdfs have a priori two modes (hence the superscript II). This model is parameterized
by (θ, σ2n).
In a second strategy, the colluders select z(i) = µ(ϕ(i)) ∈ [−1, 1]:
θ(I)c (y
′|ϕ) = e−
(y′−µ(ϕ))2
2σ2n /
√
2piσ2n . (18)
An equivalent of the marking assumption would impose that µ(0) = −1 and µ(c) = 1. The pdfs have a unique
mode (hence the superscript I). This model is parameterized by (µ, σ2n). Fig. 4 gives some examples of such pdfs.
A simple approach, termed hard decision decoding in the sequel, consists in first thresholding y′ (to quantize
y′(i) into 0 if y′(i) < 0 and 1 otherwise), and then employ the collusion process inference of Sec. IV-D on the
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hard outputs. Our soft decision decoding method resorts to the noise-aware models (17) and (18) and sets
θˆcmax = arg max
θ∈{θˆ(II)cmax ,θˆ
(I)
cmax
}
P(y|p,USI,θ). (19)
Notice that models I and II share the same number of parameters, therefore, there is no risk of over-fitting.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented the Tardos decoders in C++4. Single and joint score computation is implemented efficiently
using pre-computed lookup tables, cf. (12) and (13), and aggregation techniques described in [17]. For a code
length of m = 1024 more than 106 single and about 105 joint scores, respectively, can be computed per second
on single core of a regular Intel Core2 2.6 GHz CPU. To control the runtime, the joint decoders are confined to
5-subset decoding (tmax = 5) and p(t) ≈ 4.5 · 106 computed subsets per joint decoding stage. An iterative decoding
experiment can be executed on a PC within a couple of minutes, given enough memory, see [18] for details. To
experimentally verify the false-positive rate controlled by rare-event analysis, up to 3 ·104 tests per parameter setting
have been performed on a cluster of PCs.
First, we first compare the performance of the proposed decoders under marking assumption. Finally, we lift this
unrealistic restriction and turn to a more practical assessment using soft-decision decoding.
Unless explicitly noted, the terms single and joint decoder refer to the decoders conditioned on the inference of
the collusion process θˆcmax , cf. (8) and (12). Further, we consider the MAP decoders assuming knowledge of θc and
the compound channel decoder, cf. (7), tuned on the worst-case attack θ?k,fT , ∀k ∈ [2, . . . , cmax]. As a baseline for
a performance comparison, we always include symmetric Tardos score computation [8] with a threshold controlled
by rare-event analysis (see Sec. III-C).
A. Decoding performance under marking assumption
1) Detect-one scenario: Here the aim is to catch at most one colluder – this is the tracing scenario most commonly
considered in the literature. We compare our single and joint decoder performance against the results provided by
Nuida et al. [24] (which are the best as far as we know) and, as a second reference, the symmetric Tardos decoder.
The experimental setup considers n = 106 users and c ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6, 8} colluders performing worst-case attack
[14] against a single decoder. In Fig. 5, we plot the empirical probability of error Pe = Pfp+Pfn obtained by running
104 experiments for each setting versus the code length m. The false-positive error is controlled by thresholding
based on rare-event simulation, Pfp = 10−3, which is confirmed experimentally. Evidently, for a given probability
of error, the joint decoder succeeds in reducing the required code length over the single decoder, especially for
larger collusions.
Table I compares the code length to obtain an error rate of Pe = 10−3 for our proposed Tardos decoders and
the symmetric Tardos decoder with the results reported by Nuida et al. [24] under marking assumption. Except for
4Source code is available at http://www.irisa.fr/texmex/people/furon/src.html.
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TABLE I
CODE LENGTH COMPARISON FOR THE DETECT-ONE SCENARIO: n = 106 , WORST-CASE ATTACK AGAINST A SINGLE DECODER,
Pe = 10−3 .
Colluders
(c)
Nuida et al.
[24]
Symm.
Tardos
Proposed (cmax = 8)
Single Joint
2 253 ∼ 416 ∼ 368 ∼ 304
3 877 ∼ 864 ∼ 776 ∼ 584
4 1454 ∼ 1472 ∼ 1152 ∼ 904
6 3640 ∼ 2944 ∼ 2304 ∼ 1616
8 6815 ∼ 5248 ∼ 3712 ∼ 2688
c = 2, the proposed decoders can substantially reduce the required code length and the joint decoder improves the
results of the single decoder. Note that Nuida’s results give analytic code length assuming a particular number of
colluders for constructing the code while our results are experimental estimates based on worst-case attack against
a single decoder and without knowing c (subject to c ≤ cmax = 8). Results with c known are provided in [18]
and show a slightly better performance: the required code length of the joint decoder is then slightly shorter than
Nuida’s code in case c = 2.
2) Detect-many scenario: We now consider the more realistic case where the code length m is fixed and the
false-negative error rate is only a minor concern5 while the false-positive probability is critical to avoid an accusation
of an innocent. The aim is to identify as many colluders as possible.
5A tracing schemes rightly accusing a colluder half of the time might be enough to dissuade dishonest users.
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Figures 6(a)–6(d) show the average number of identified colluders by different decoding approaches. The exper-
imental setup considers n = 106 users, code length m = 2048, and several collusion attacks (worst-case attacks,
i.e. minimizing the achievable rate of a single or joint decoder, interleaving and majority which is a rather mild
attack) carried out by two to eight colluders. The global probability of a false positive error is fixed to Pfp = 10−3.
As expected, the MAP single decoder knowing θc provides the best decoding performance amongst the single
decoders, yet is unobtainable in practice. The symmetric Tardos decoder performs poorly but evenly against all
attacks; the single decoder based on the compound channel (7) improves the results only slightly.
The joint decoders consistently achieve to identify most colluders – with a dramatic margin in case the traitors
choose the worst-case attack against a single decoder. This attack bothers the very first step of our decoder, but
as soon as some side information is available or a joint decoder is used, this is no longer the worst case attack.
Finding the worst case attack against our iterative decoder is indeed difficult. A good guess is the interleaving
attack which is asymptotically the worst case against the joint decoder [1]. The experiments show that it reduces
the performance of the joint decoders substantially for large c.
The decoder based on the inference θˆcmax and the true MAP are different when c is lower than cmax. However,
this is not a big deal in practice for a fixed m: for small c, the code is long enough to face the collusion even if the
score is less discriminative than the ideal MAP; for big c the score of our decoder gets closer to the ideal MAP.
B. Decoding performance of the soft decoder
We assess the performance of the soft decision decoders proposed in Sec. V in two tracing scenarios: (i)
Kuribayashi considers in [21] n = 104 users and code length m = 104, (ii) a large-scale setup with 33 554 432
users and m = 7 440 where Jourdas and Moulin [23] provide results for their high-rate random-like fingerprinting
code under averaging and interleaving attack.
In Fig. 7, we compare the average number of identified colluders for the single and joint decoder using different
estimates of the collusion process: hard relates to decoders using hard thresholding and θˆcmax while soft identifies
the noise-aware decoders relying on θˆ
(I)
cmax or θˆ
(II)
cmax chosen adaptively based on the likelihood of the two models. All
plots also show the results for the (hard-thresholding) symmetric Tardos decoder. The false-positive rate is set to
10−4. Extensive experiments (3 · 104 test runs) have been carried out to validate the accusation threshold obtained
by rare-event simulation. As expected, soft decoding offers substantial gains in decoding performance. The margin
between the single and joint decoders depends on the collusion strategy. Dramatic improvements can be seen when
the collusion chooses the worst-case attack against a single decoder, cf. Fig. 7(a). On the other hand, the gain is
negligible when averaging is performed.
Note that the attacks in (a)–(c) pertain to the pick-and paste attacks while Fig. 7(d) shows the linear averaging
attack.
Comparison with the results provided in [21] for the majority attack is difficult: (i) they were obtained for Nuida’s
discrete code construction [24] tuned on c = 7 colluders, and (ii) the false-positive rate of [21] does not seem to be
under control for the symmetric Tardos code. We suggest to use the hard symmetric Tardos decoder [8] as a baseline
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for performance comparison. By replacing the accusation thresholds proposed in [21] with a rare-event simulation,
we are able to fix the false-alarm rate in case of the symmetric Tardos code. Furthermore, the decoding results
given in [21] for the discrete variant of the fingerprinting code (i.e. Nuida’s construction) could be significantly
improved by rare-event simulation based thresholding. Contrary to the claim of [21], soft decision decoding always
provides a performance benefit over the hard decoders.
In Fig. 8 we illustrate the decoding performance when dealing with a large user base. We consider averaging
and interleaving attacks by c = 2, . . . , 12 and c = 2, . . . , 8 colluders (cmax = 12 and cmax = 8, respectively)
followed by AWGN with variance σ2n = 1. The global false-positive rate is set up to 10
−3. The benefit of the
soft decoding approach in clearly evident. Joint decoding provides only a very limited increase in the number of
identified colluders. For comparison, Jourdas & Moulin indicate an error rate of Pe = 0.0074 for c = 10 colluders
in the first, and Pe = 0.004 for c = 5 colluders in the second setting for a detect-one scenario [23].
In [25], Pfp = 0.0016 and Pfn = 0.044 are given for the first experiment (Fig. 8(a)) by introducing a threshold to
control the false-positive rate. Our soft joint decoder achieves a Pfn = 0.046 for Pfp = 10−3 (for c = 10 colluders),
catching 2.6 traitors on average.
In the second experiment (see Fig. 8(b)), our joint decoder compares more favorably: with the given code length,
all c = 5 colluders can be identified and for a collusion size c = 8, 4.5 traitors are accused without observing any
decoding failure in 3 · 103 tests.
C. Runtime Analysis
Single decoding can be efficiently implemented to compute more than one million scores for a code of length
m = 1024 per second. Its complexity is in O(n ·m). Selecting the p(t) most likely guilty users can be efficiently
done with the max-heap algorithm. Yet, it consumes a substantial parts of the runtime for small m. The runtime
contribution of the joint decoding stage clearly depends on the size of pruned list of suspects, O(m · p(t)) and is
independent of the subset size t thanks to the revolving door enumeration method of the subsets6. Restricting p(t)
and tmax keeps the joint decoding approach computationally tractable. Better decoding performance can be obtained
using higher values at the cost of a substantial increase in runtime. Experiments have shown that even the moderate
settings (p(t) ≈ 4.5 · 106 and tmax = 5) achieve a considerable gain of the joint over the single decoder for several
collusion channels.
Thresholding accounts for more than half of the runtime in the experimental setups investigated in this work.
However, this is not a serious issue for applications with a large user base or when p(t) becomes large. Thresholding
depends on the subset size t because a large number of random codeword combinations must be generated and
because we seek lower probability level in O(Pfp/nt). Therefore, the complexity is in O(m · t2 · log(n)) according
to [16]. There are no more than cmax such iteration with t ≤ cmax, so that the global complexity of our decoder
stays in O(m log(n)).
6In each step ϕ is updated by replacing one user’s codeword. See [18] for details.
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More details about the runtime are given in [18]. Note that results have been obtained with a single CPU core
although a parallel implementation can be easily achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION
Decoding probabilistic fingerprinting codes in practice means to trace guilty persons over a large set of users while
having no information about the size nor the strategy of the collusion. This must be done reliably by guaranteeing
a controlled probability of false alarm.
Our decoder implements provably good concepts of information theory (joint decoding, side information, linear
decoder for compound channels) and statistics (estimation of extreme quantile of a rare event). Its extension to soft
output decoding is straightforward as its does not change its architecture.
Since the proposed iterative method is neither just a single decoder nor completely a joint decoder (it only
considers subsets over a short list of suspects), it is rather difficult to find the best distribution for code construction
and its worst case attack. Experiments show that the interleaving attack is indeed more dangerous than the worst-case
attack against a single decoder.
APPENDIX
We prove that Ecmax(θc) = {θ˜k|k ≤ cmax,P(y|p, θ˜k) = P(y|p,θc), ∀(y, p) ∈ {0, 1} × [0, 1]} is one sided. The
collusion channels of this set share the property that P(Y = 1|p, θ˜k) = q(p) ≥ 0,∀p ∈ [0, 1]. From [14, Eq. (20)]:
P(Y = 1|X = 1, p, θ˜k) = q(p) + k−1(1− p)q′(p) (20)
P(Y = 1|X = 0, p, θ˜k) = q(p)− k−1pq′(p) (21)
Take (θ˜kA , θ˜kB ) ∈ Ecmax(θc)2 s.t. kA < kB . We first show that R(fT , θ˜kA) > R(fT , θ˜kB ) so that the minimizer
of R(fT ,θ) over Ecmax(θc) is indeed θ˜cmax . Denote by (µ1, µ2) the following conditional probability distributions:
µ1(y, x|p) = P(Y = y|p) = q(p)y(1− q(p))(1−y) (22)
µ2(y, x|p) = P(Y = y|X = x, p, θ˜kA). (23)
Then, P(Y |X, p, θ˜kB ) = (1 − λ)µ1(Y,X|p) + λµ2(Y,X|p), ∀p ∈ [0, 1], with λ = kA/kB < 1. The mutual
information is a convex function of P(Y |X, p) for fixed P(X|p) so that, once integrated over fT (p), we have
R(fT , θ˜kB ) ≤ (1− λ) · 0 + λ ·R(fT , θ˜kA) < R(fT , θ˜kA). (24)
We now prove that (6) holds ∀θ ∈ Ecmax(θc). This is equivalent to
R(fT , θ˜k)−D(P(Y,X|θ˜k)||P(Y,X|θ˜cmax))−R(fT , θ˜cmax) ≥ 0, (25)
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where the LHS is of the form EP∼fT [g(P )]. After developing the expressions, we find that:
g(p) = (k−1 − c−1max)p(1− p) ·(
q′(p) log
(
1 +
1− p
cmax
q′(p)
q(p)
)
+
q′(p) log
(
1 +
p
cmax
q′(p)
1− q(p)
)
−
q′(p) log
(
1− 1− p
cmax
q′(p)
1− q(p)
)
−
q′(p) log
(
1− p
cmax
q′(p)
q(p)
))
(26)
The four terms inside parenthesis are not negative because, with γ > 0, x log(1 + γx) ≥ 0 for x > −γ−1. Since
k ≤ cmax, we obtain g(p) ≥ 0, whence (6).
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Fig. 6. Decoder comparison in the detect-many tracing scenario: n = 106, m = 2048, Pfp = 10−3, cmax = 8. (Best viewed in color.)
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(d) Averaging Attack
Fig. 7. Kuribayashi setup: n = 104, m = 104, Pfp = 10−4, c = 10, cmax = 20; worst-case, interleaving, majority and averaging attack
followed by AWGN (−4, . . . , 10 dB SNR).
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(b) Interleaving Attack
Fig. 8. Jourdas & Moulin setup: n = 33 554 432, m = 7440, Pfp = 10−3, averaging and interleaving attack followed by AWGN (0 dB
SNR).
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